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I. INTRODUCTION
In Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,1 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, thus clearing the way for the State of Israel to
1. 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1198 (1986). Subsequent
to this case, Demjanjuk sought a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution of the
extradition request. Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Demjanjuk
contended that the Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the International
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide modified the
extradition treaty and voided the instant court of appeals' decision. Id. at 1115. How-
ever, because this convention was not yet in effect in the United States and because
Demjanjuk was not being extradited for the crime of genocide, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia denied the requests. Id. Subsequently, the United States
extradited Demjanjuk to Israel. Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
On April 18, 1988, a three judge panel in Israel convicted Demjanjuk of Nazi war
crimes. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 3. He was convicted on four
counts: war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, and
crimes against persecuted people. Id. The court found that there was no doubt that
Demjanjuk was "Ivan the Terrible." Id. On April 25, 1988, the Israeli court sentenced
Demjanjuk to death by hanging. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 26, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
(65)
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extradite John Demjanjuk.2 Looking to the treaty of extradition be-
tween the State of Israel and the United States$ for guidance, the court
found that the request for extradition met all the requirements."
This note analyzes the Demjanjuk decision, specifically examining
the issues of extradition discussed by the court, including "double crim-
inality" and "universal jurisdiction." As contrasted to the instant case,
this note also discusses the political crime exception to extradition.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
John Demjanjuk, the petitioner, was a native of the Ukraine, a
republic of the Soviet Union.' In 1952, under the Displaced Persons
Act of 1948, he entered the United States and in 1958, became a natu-
ralized citizen. Since arriving in the United States, he resided in
Cleveland, Ohio.7
In 1981, based upon evidence that both Demjanjuk's certificate of
naturalization and the order admitting him to the United States were
illegally procured through willful misrepresentation of material facts,8
the District Court of Northern Ohio revoked the certificate and vacated
the order.9 The evidence showed that, shortly after the Soviet Union
had drafted Demjanjuk, he was captured by the German army." In
1942, after short periods of time in German prisoner of war camps,
Demjanjuk became a Schutzstaffel, an SS guard, in Treblinka, Po-
2. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d 571.
3. Convention on Extradition, December 10, 1962, United States-Israel, 14 U.S.T.
1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476 [hereinafter Extradition Convention].
4. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 571.
5. Id. at 575.
6. id.
7. Id.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982) states:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective districts, upon
affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any court speci-
fied in subsection (a) of section 1421 of this title in the judicial district in which
the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of
revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and can-
celing the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and certifi-
cate of naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of
a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, and such revocation and setting
aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and cancelling of certificate
of naturalization shall be effective as of the original date of the order and certifi-
cate . . . . Id.
9. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 575. See U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D.
Ohio 1981), affid per curiam, 680 F.2d 32, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
10. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 575.
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land." On his application for naturalization, Demjanjuk misstated his
place of residence from 1937 through 1948, and he failed to admit
serving as an SS guard and a soldier in a German military unit.' 2
During his denaturalization proceedings, Demjanjuk acknowledged
that he falsified statements concerning his residence, and admitted he
had served as a German soldier." Although documentary evidence and
eyewitness testimony placed him at Treblinka as an SS guard during
its operation as a concentration camp, Demjanjuk steadfastly denied
ever serving at Treblinka."
As a result of the court's findings, the United States began depor-
tation proceedings against Demjanjuk.' 5 Pursuant to the treaty between
the United States and Israel, 6 and in accordance with the federal stat-
ute governing American extradition procedures, 17 the State of Israel
filed a request with the State Department of the United States seeking
the extradition of Demjanjuk.'8 The U. S. Attorney for the Northern
District of Ohio filed a complaint on behalf of the State of Israel seek-
ing Demjanjuk's arrest and a hearing for his extradition." In pertinent
11. id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The evidence included eyewitness testimony from five survivors of Treb-
linka and one guard who served at Treblinka identifying Demjanjuk as a guard known
as "Ivan or Iwan Grozny" or "Ivan the Terrible." Id.
15. Id.
16. See Extradition Convention, supra note 3.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982) states:
[w]henever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States or any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any
magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a
court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made
under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes
provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension
of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or
magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and consid-
ered. If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge
under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same,
together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of
State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of
such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, according to the stipu-
lations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the commit-
ment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such surren-
der shall be made.
18. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 575.
19. Id.
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part, the complaint charged Demjanjuk with the murder of "tens of
thousands of Jews and non-Jews" while operating gas chambers at
Treblinka.2 0 Following the hearing, the district court entered an order
certifying to the Secretary of State that Demjanjuk was subject to ex-
tradition.2" As a result of this order, bond previously granted to
Demjanjuk was revoked, and pending a warrant of surrender by the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General of the United States assumed
custody of Demjanjuk.22 Demjanjuk subsequently petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus, 23 and the district court denied his request.2 This ap-
peal followed.
III. THE TREATY AND THE EXTRADITION CHARGE
The extradition sought was pursuant to the treaty signed by the
United States and the State of Israel on December 10, 1962, and effec-
tive December 5, 1963.25 In pertinent part, the treaty states:
Article I
Each Contracting Party agrees, under the conditions and cir-
cumstances established by the present Convention, reciprocally to
deliver up persons found in its territory who have been charged
with or convicted of any of the offenses mentioned in Article II of
the present Convention committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the other, or outside thereof under the conditions specified in
Article III of the present Convention.
Article II
Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of the
present Convention for prosecution when they have been charged
with, or to undergo sentence when they have been convicted of, any
of the following offenses:
1. Murder.
2. Manslaughter.
20. Id. at 578.
21. Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed,
762 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1985).
22. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 575.
23. The Demjanjuk court stated that the only method for review of an order certi-
fying extradition is a collateral petition for a writ of habeas corpus; there is no direct
appeal. Id. at 576.
24. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 612 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ohio), af'd., 776 F.2d 571
(6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1198 (1986).
25. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 575.
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3. Malicious wounding; inflicting grievous bodily harm.
Article III
When the offense has been committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the requesting Party, extradition need not be granted
unless the laws of the requested Party provide for the punishment
of such an offense committed in similar circumstances.
The words "territorial jurisdiction" as used in this Article and
in Article I of the present Convention mean: territory, including
territorial waters, and the airspace thereover belonging to or under
the control of one of the Contracting Parties, and vessels and air-
craft belong to one of the Contracting Parties or to a citizen or
corporation thereof when such vessel is on the high seas or such
aircraft is over the high seas. 6
The extradition request specifically charged that Demjanjuk
"'murdered tens of thousands of Jews and non-Jews' while operating
the gas chambers to exterminate prisoners at Treblinka." 7 The war-
rant asserted that the acts were committed "with the intention of de-
stroying the Jewish people and to commit crimes against humanity. '2 8
In Israel, these acts are punishable under a 1950 statute which made
certain crimes against the Jewish people, against humanity, and "war
crimes committed during the Nazi period" criminal acts. 9 In pertinent
part, the statute reads:
"crime against the Jewish people" means any of the following acts,
committed with intent to destroy the Jewish people in whole or in
part:
1. killing Jews;
2. causing serious bodily or mental harm to Jews;
3. placing Jews in living conditions calculated to bring about
their physical destruction;
26. Extradition Convention, supra note 3, arts. I-Ill.
27. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 578. Because of the "principle of specialty," Israel
may only prosecute Demjanjuk for offenses for which the United States specifically
granted extradition. Id. at 583.
28. Id. at 578.
29. Id. (citing the Nazis & Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, Law of Aug.
1, 1950, 4 Laws St. Isr. No. 64).
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4. imposing measures intended to prevent births among Jews;
5. forcibly transferring Jewish children to another national or
religious group;
6. destroying or desecrating Jewish religious or cultural assets
or values;
7. inciting to hatred of Jews;
"crime against humanity" means any of the following acts:
murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or deportation
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
and persecution on national, racial, religious or political grounds;
"war crime" means any of the following acts:
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to forced labour or for
any other purpose, of civilian population of or in occupied territory;
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas;
killing of hostages; plunder of public or private property; wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or villages; and devastation not justified
by military necessity.30
In the complaint, the charge of murdering Jews was equated to the
specific criminal offenses enumerated in the treaty: murder, malicious
wounding, and inflicting "grievous bodily harm."31
IV. THE CASE
On an appeal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a court only
inquires into three specific areas: (1) whether the magistrate had juris-
diction, (2) whether the offense charged was within the treaty, and (3)
whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding of reasonable
grounds to believe the accused was guilty. 32 Demjanjuk challenged the
district court's decision arguing that the court acted improperly in
these three areas.33
30. Id. at 578-579 (quoting the Nazis & Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 4
Laws St. Isr. No. 64).
31. Id. at 578.
32. Id. at 576 (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)).
33. Id. at 576. As an ancillary matter, Demjanjuk contended that because in prior
litigation the same district judge determined that Demjanjuk committed the acts which
EXTRADITION
A. Whether the Magistrate Had Jurisdiction
1. "Double Criminality" Requirement
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
section 487(c) provides that extradition of an accused offender is not
allowed "[i]f the offense with which he is charged or of which he has
been convicted is not punishable as a serious crime both in the request-
ing and in the requested state." 4 The Supreme Court applied this the-
ory of "double criminality" in Collins v. Loisel,35 holding:
[t]he law does not require that the name by which the crime is
described in the two countries shall be the same; nor that the scope
of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same
in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is
criminal in both jurisdictions.36
Demjanjuk contended that because the crime of "murdering tens
of thousands of Jews and non-Jews" was not a specific crime in the
United States, the extradition request should fail.3 7 The court, however,
applying the doctrine set down in Collins, disagreed and denied the
claim.38 The court held that the test for "double criminality" only re-
quired the same act, not the specific crime. 9 Demjanjuk was charged
with the act of unlawfully killing one or. more persons which is
equivalent to an act of murder punishable in both the United States
and the State of Israel.4 The court held that the absence of a specific
crime in the United States for the mass murder of Jews was irrelevant.
required his denaturalization, Demjanjuk argued that the judge was biased against
him. Id. He based his assertion on 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982) which states, "[a]ny
justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-
ceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." However, the ab-
sence of any evidence of actual bias or prejudice from an external source, as required
by section 455(b), precluded the court from accepting this argument. Demjanjuk, 776
F.2d at 576.
34. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 487(c)
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
35. 259 U.S. 309 (1922). In Collins, the petitioner contended that the crime of
cheating, the charge in the requesting state, was dissimilar to the crime of obtaining
property under false pretenses, the charge in the requested state. Id. at 311.
36. Id. at 312.
37. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 576.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 580.
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It therefore denied Demjanjuk's assertion of a lack of "double
criminality.""'
2. "Universal Jurisdiction"
For extradition to be granted, the person sought must have com-
mitted crimes "within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government,"
specifically the requesting country.42 Demjanjuk contended that be-
cause he was neither a citizen nor a resident of the State of Israel,
because the alleged crimes took place in Poland, and because the acts
charged occurred prior to the establishment of the State of Israel,
Israel lacked jurisdictional and extraditional power.43
According to the treaty, for offenses committed outside of the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the requesting party, "extradition need not be
granted unless the laws of the requested party provide for the punish-
ment of such an offense committed in similar circumstances."4" The
Demjanjuk court interpreted this language to mean that the parties
recognized the right to request extradition for "extra-territorial"
crimes, and that the requested party had the discretion to deny extradi-
tion if its laws did not provide for punishment for the crime charged.' 5
The Israeli statute under which Demjanjuk was charged was
designed to punish those involved in carrying out Hitler's "final solu-
tion." 6 Thereby, Israel claimed "extra-territorial" jurisdiction over
"crimes against the Jewish people," "crimes against humanity," and
"'war crimes' committed during the Nazi years.' "Universal jurisdic-
tion" allows "a state to exercise jurisdiction to define and punish cer-
tain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft,
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982)). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 34,
§ 486(a).
43. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 580.
44. Id. (citing Extradition Convention, supra note 3, art. III).
45. Id. at 581. Demjanjuk contended that the use of the words "need not" prohib-
ited his extradition because "war crimes" and crimes against humanity are not crimi-
nal offenses in the United States. Id. at 580-581. However, in cases where the re-
quested nation does not provide punishment for the charged offenses, this terminology
has been held to grant the judiciary the discretion to determine whether to extradite.
Id. at 581 (citing In re Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1982) and In re Assarsson,
635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981)).
46. Id. (citing the Nazis & Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 4 Laws St. Isr.
No. 64).
47. Id. at 581.
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genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism . *.". .,, These crimes are
universally condemned and any perpetrators are considered to be ene-
mies of all people. Therefore, any nation with custody may punish the
perpetrators according to its laws applicable to these offenses.49 The
law of the United States includes international law, and international
law recognizes "universal jurisdiction" over certain crimes."
According to section 443 of the Restatement, "a state's courts may
exercise jurisdiction to enforce the state's criminal laws which punish
universal crimes . . or other non-territorial offenses within the state's
jurisdiction to prescribe." '51 Because the State of Israel sought to en-
force its criminal laws for crimes universally recognized and con-
demned, the court of appeals held that despite the fact that the crimes
occurred in Poland, Israel had the right to extradite Demjanjuk 2 In
addition, the court held that because under the universality principle
neither the nationality of the accused nor the location of the crime is
material, the fact that the State of Israel was not in existence at the
time of the alleged crimes did not bar the extradition.5" The universal-
ity principle assumes that the crimes are offenses against the laws of all
nations as well as against humanity. Therefore, the State of Israel as
the prosecuting nation had the right to seek punishment of the perpe-
trator of the crime.5 4
B. Whether the Offense Charged Was Within the Treaty
A fundamental requirement for extradition is that the crime
charged must be provided for in the treaty between the requesting and
the requested nations.5 5 Dernjanjuk contended that the charge of "mur-
dering tens of thousands of Jews and non-Jews" was not covered under
the term of "murder" in the treaty. 56 Based on a logical reading of the
treaty and the interpretation given the treaty by the State Depart-
48. Id. at 582 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 404).
49. Id. at 582. "Universal jurisdiction" had already been asserted regarding "war
crimes" with the establishment of the International Military Tribunal. Id. This tribunal
system consisted of one court in Nuremberg which tried major Nazi officials, and sev-
eral courts within the four occupational zones of post-war Germany which tried lesser
Nazis. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, §443).
52. Id. at 582.
53. Id. at 582-583.
54. Id. at 583.
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982); Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312
(1925).
56. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 579.
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ment, 7 the court had no difficulty holding that "murder" included the
mass murder of Jews.
58
C. Whether the Evidence Was Sufficient to Warrant a Finding of
Reasonable Grounds to Believe the Accused Guilty
The evidence presented against Demjanjuk included sworn eyewit-
ness testimony from survivors of Treblinka who had been prisoners be-
tween 1942 and 1943."6 These eyewitnesses identified Demjanjuk as an
SS guard who herded prisoners into gas chambers and operated the
mechanism which filled the chambers with gas.6 0 They also testified to
having seen Demjanjuk beat and maim prisoners, at times causing their
deaths.6 ' In addition, there was corroborating testimony from a former
German guard at Treblinka who identified Demjanjuk as "Ivan the
Terrible."6 2 As required by 18 U.S.C. section 3190,63 an official of the
United States State Department authenticated the evidence." On these
bases, the court held that the evidence was admissible in court and
sufficient to show probable cause that Demjanjuk committed the acts
charged.65
V. THE POLITICAL CRIME EXCEPTION
The allowance of extradition in the instant case is in sharp con-
57. There is considerable weight given to interpretations of treaties as rendered by
the political department of a government. See Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 579 (quoting
Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 263 (6th Cir. 1957) and Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S.
447 (1913)).
58. Id. at 579.
59. Id. at 576.
60. id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1982) states:
Depositions, warrants, or other papers or copies thereof offered in evidence upon
the hearing of any extradition case shall be received and admitted as evidence on
such hearing for all the purposes of such hearing if they shall be properly and
legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by
the tribunals of the foreign country from which the accused party shall have es-
caped, and the certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
United States resident in such foreign country shall be proof that the same, so
offered, are authenticated in the manner required. Id.
64. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 576.
65. Id. In addition, Demjanjuk challenged the documentary evidence contending it
was forged. Id. The court dismissed this charge and noted that, even in the absence of
the documentary evidence, there was sufficient grounds to find probable cause. ld.
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trast to the traditional disallowance of extradition for perpetrators of
political crimes. All extradition treaties include an exception precluding
extradition for political crimes perpetrated against the requesting na-
tion. 66 For example, the treaty between the United States and the
United Kingdom specifies that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if
.. .the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the
requesting party as one of a political character . ...*- This exclusion
allows perpetrators of heinous crimes to escape prosecution by seeking
asylum in a foreign country which will use the political crime exception
to deny an extradition request. 8 Because of this exclusion, "crimes
may have been committed of the most atrocious and inhuman charac-
ter and still the perpetrators of such crimes escape punishment as fugi-
tives beyond the reach of extradition." '69
The origin of the political crime exception was based on the beliefs
that: (1) individuals have "a right to resort to political activism to fos-
ter political change, ' 70 (2) "individuals should not be returned to their
countries where they may be subjected to unfair trials and punishments
because of their political opinions," and (3) "governments should not
intervene in the international political struggles of other nations."'
l
Extradition is generally not allowed for "pure political crimes"
such as treason, sedition, and espionage .7 Litigation contesting extradi-
tion for political crimes usually involves "relative political crimes."
These are otherwise common crimes committed either in connection
with a political act, for political motives, or within a political context.7
Courts have held that to be exempt from extradition, the charged of-
fense must be "incidental to," "in the course of," or "in the furtherance
of" a political uprising or disturbance. 4 In analyzing the facts of a
case, a court must determine whether "it is clear that the man was
acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a
66. Note, Eliminating the Political Offense Exception for Violent Crimes: The
Proposed United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 26 VA. 1
INT'L L. 755, 759 (1986).
67. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 271
(1986) (citing the Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom,
28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468, art. V(1)(c)(i)).
68. See generally Quinn, 783 F.2d at 796-803.
69. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 997 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
70. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793 (quoting Note, American Courts and Modern Terror-
ism: The Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 622 (1981)).
71. Id. at 793.
72. Id. at 793-794.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 797.
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political character with a political object, and as part of the political
movement and uprising in which he was taking part."7 5 For example, in
In re Ezeta,8 San Salvador sought extradition of Antonio Ezeta, its
former President, and four of his military officers accused of crimes
which occurred during the revolutionary take-over of the country.1 Be-
cause of the political crime exception, the District Court of Northern
California denied the extradition for crimes which occurred during a
conflict between military forces.78 However, because one of the crimes
occurred four months prior to the hostilities, the court held that the
political crime exception was not operative. Therefore, the court al-
lowed the extradition of the accused perpetrator.79
Allowance of the political crime exception can create conflicts be-
tween the requested and requesting countries. By refusing extradition
requests, the requested country indicates doubt about the requesting
country's good faith and the integrity of its legal system, and the act
can be interpreted as an endorsement of the accused's actions.8" In
1978, President Mobutu of Zaire characterized Belgium's denial of the
extradition of a political adversary as "effective support to those willing
to overthrow him." In Mobutu's eyes, Belgium's action was the
equivalent of a hostile act directed against his government.81 Because
of differing judicial interpretations of the political offense clause, there
may also be an imbalance in the number of extraditions allowed from
each country.8
The standard for determining whether a crime meets the political
crime exception has been held to be both underinclusive and over-
broad.83 The narrowness of the standard was evident in Escobedo v.
United States,84 where the court held that because the crime did not
occur during a political uprising, the political crime exception was not
75. In re Ezeta, 62 F. at 999 (quoting In re Castioni, I Q.B. 149 (1891)).
76. Ezeta, 62 F. at 972.
77. Id. at 978.
78. Id. at 1002-1003.
79. Id. at 986.
80. Comment, International Law - Political Offense Exception to Extradition: A
19th Century British Standard in 20th Century American Courts, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1005, 1007 (1984).
81. Gilbert, Terrorism & the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 695 (1985).
82. Comment, supra note 80, at 1007.
83. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 798; Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 519 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
84. 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980) and 450 U.S.
922 (1981).
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operative. 85 The alleged crime was the kidnapping of a Cuban consul,
reportedly for the purpose of ransoming the consul for political prison-
ers being held in Cuba.86 Technically, this crime did not fall within the
requirements for the political exception. It is clear, however, that this
was a political act and extradition should not have been allowed.87 In
the alternative, due to the overbroad nature of the exception, essentially
any crime occurring during a political uprising and in the furtherance
of a rebellion can theoretically qualify as a political crime."
However, the political crime exception cannot be used as protec-
tion against crimes which violate international law, such as crimes
against humanity. 89 Because these crimes could not have been perpe-
trated without the toleration of the authority of a state, these crimes,
including "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population . . . or perse-
cution on political, racial, or religious grounds," 90 constitute an abuse
of sovereignty. 91 The political offense exception can never protect those
carrying out a governmental policy calling for acts of destruction whose
nature and scope exceed human imagination.92 Because these crimes
are unparalleled in history, they are excluded from protection under
normally applicable laws.93
In recent years, the political crime exception has been used exten-
sively to prevent the extradition of members of the Provisional Irish
Republican Army ("PIRA"). For example, in In re McMullen,94 the
District Court of Northern California held that, even though the com-
mitted offense was deplorable, the crime met the requisites for exemp-
tion as a political crime. Therefore, the court denied the extradition
request.9 5 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
85. Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1104.
86. Id.
87. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 798.
88. Note, supra note 66, at 766-767.
89. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 799-801.
90. Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextradition
of Political Offenders, 62 MICH. L. REV. 927, 928 (1964) (quoting Charter of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, art. 6, para. (c)).
91. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 799-800.
92. Id. at 801.
93. Id.
94. No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. 1979).
95. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 801 (citing In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG). The
court held that because the acts occurred during a state of political uprising in the
United Kingdom and were "incidental to" a political disturbance, McMullen, a PIRA
member charged with murder in connection with the bombing of military barracks in
England, was held exempt from extradition. Id.
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In re Macklin,96 denied the extradition request for a PIRA member
charged with wounding a British soldier during a gun battle.97 The
court, applying the political crime exception test, held that the crime
was "incidental to" the PIRA's political uprising.98 Also, in In re Do-
herty,99 the District Court of Southern New York denied the extradi-
tion request for Doherty, a PIRA member charged with the murder of
a British officer during an attempted ambush of a convoy of British
soldiers. 00 The court applied the political crime exception because it
viewed the acts as traditional military hostilities. 101 Finally, in Quinn v.
Robinson, the only case in which a PIRA member was extradited,
Quinn failed to meet the qualifications for the exception solely because
the charged crimes did not occur in the same location as the rebel-
lion.10 2 Had the charged crimes occurred in Northern Ireland, rather
than in England, it is probable that Quinn would have been protected
from extradition. 0 3
It seems contrary to public policy and the need for international
stability to protect these suspected perpetrators from facing trial for
crimes charged against them. The sheer horror of the acts perpetrated,
as well as the availability of alternative peaceful means of protest, pre-
cludes justification for such protection.Y04 In Eain v. Wilkes,10 5 the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took the first judicial step
towards a stricter standard for the exception.106 The court held that a
Palestine Liberation Organization member was subject to extradition to
the State of Israel for planting a bomb in Tiberias, Israel which ex-
ploded and killed two boys and injured thirty people.' 0 7 The court rea-
soned that the political crime exception required direct political effect
from the act. 10 8 In addition, the court held that because the act could
96. 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
97. Id. at 125.
98. Id.
99. 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). This decision provoked anger in the
United Kingdom and was characterized as "outrageous" in the United States. Recent
Development, Extradition: Limitation of the Political Offense Exception, 27 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 266, 270-271 (1986).
100. Recent Development, supra note 99, at 272.
101. Id. at 276-277.
102. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 814.
103. Note, supra note 66, at 768.
104. See generally Gilbert, supra note 81, at 705.
105. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
106. Id. at 520.
107. Id. at 518.
108. Id. at 520-521.
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be classified as an individual act of violence rather than part of an on-
going battle between contending armies and because the act was perpe-
trated in order to bring about the ultimate expulsion of the entire Is-
raeli population, the attack should be considered as perpetrated against
a social structure rather than a political structure. 10 9 Therefore, the ac-
cused was not protected by the political crime exception."' Although
the court in In re Doherty." held the political crime exception was
operative, it indicated an inclination towards a more severe standard."'
Noting that prior lenient decisions would be inconsistent with the real-
ity of the modern world, the court stated that the political crime excep-
tion should not be used to protect "every act committed for a political
purpose or during a political disturbance.""' The court enumerated
acts which fall outside of the political crime exception, including acts
"inconsistent with international standards of civilized conduct," such as
bombings in public places, acts which "transcend the limits of interna-
tional law," harm to hostages, violations of the Geneva convention, or
acts of "amorphous" or "fanatic" groups without structure, organiza-
tion, or clearly defined political objectives." 4
According to the Reagan Administration, the slow progress to-
wards a tougher standard invites perpetration of heinous crimes against
civilians and poses a threat to the stability of both the requesting and
the requested countries." 5 Therefore, the Administration is taking ac-
tion." 6 On June 25, 1985, the United States and the United Kingdom
signed a new extradition treaty" 7 sharply limiting the judiciary's abil-
ity to prevent the extradition of PIRA members." 8 This Supplemen-
109. Id. at 519-520.
110. Id.
111. 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
112. Id. at 274.
113. Id.
114. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 803 (citing Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 274-276).
115. See Note, supra note 66, at 755.
116. Id.
117. Supplementary Treaty, June 25, 1986, United States-United Kingdom, re-
printed in 24 I.L.M. 1105 (1985) [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty). The new treaty
supplements the 1972 treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. Re-
cent Development, supra note 99, at 266. The Supplementary Treaty was ratified by
the United Kingdom Order in Council on December 15, 1986, and entered into force
on December 23, 1986.
118. Note, supra note 66, at 755.
The Reagan Administration is currently negotiating to similarly supplement its
extradition treaties with other nations. Id. at 756-757 (citing Statement of A. Sofaer
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aug. 1, 1985, at 21). Further recogni-
tion of the problem of extraditing these alleged "political" criminals is evidenced by a
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tary Treaty exempts from the political crime exception crimes which
are generally associated with terrorist activities. 119 In pertinent part,
the treaty states:
Article 1
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the follow-
ing offenses shall be regarded as an offense of a political character:
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing
grievous bodily harm;
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, in-
cluding taking a hostage;
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket,
firearm, letter or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this use
endangers any person; and
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or par-
ticipation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to
commit such an offense.
Article 5
This Supplementary Treaty shall apply to any offense commit-
ted before or after this Supplementary Treaty enters into force,
provided that this Supplementary Treaty shall not apply to an of-
fense committed before this Supplementary Treaty enters into force
which was not an offense under the laws of both Contracting Par-
ties at the time of its commission.1 20 In depoliticizing these crimes,
resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The resolution,
outlining measures to prevent international terrorism, inter alia,
urges all States to co-operate with one another more closely, especially through the
exchange of relevant information concerning the prevention and combating of ter-
rorism, the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of the perpetrators of such
acts, the conclusion of special treaties and/or the incorporation into appropriate
bilateral treaties of special clauses, in particular regarding the extradition or pros-
ecution of terrorists ....
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution on Measures to Prevent International
Terrorism, Res. 40/61 para. 8 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 239, 241 (1986).
119. Recent Development, supra note 99, at 266. The Supplementary Treaty al-
lows for application to acts committed prior to its existence, and permits retroactive
application to extraditions previously refused. Id. at 267-268.
120. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 117, arts. 1, 4.
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tension created by the denial of extradition for alleged criminals
will be diminished.12 1 Perpetrators of heinous crimes will no longer
be able to rely on the political crime exception to escape extradition
for their criminal acts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Demjanjuk and the Supplementary Treaty indicate that attitudes
toward extradition are changing. Some crimes that now demand extra-
dition were barred from extradition because they fell within the politi-
cal crime exception. Thus, the current stricter standard allows extradi-
tion in more situations than ever before.
John Demjanjuk was neither a citizen of Israel nor had his alleged
crimes occurred there. Nevertheless, he was extadited by the United
States to Israel. Power to demand extradition was founded on the "uni-
versal jurisdiction" principle. This principle applies to crimes which are
so heinous that they are universally condemned by society as a whole.
Considered as "crimes against humanity," the crimes which meet the
requirements of the "universal jurisdiction" principle include war
crimes, such as those allegedly committed by Demjanjuk, as well as
genocide, piracy, and slave trade. Because these crimes are universally
condemned, the prosecuting nation serves as a representative of society.
The "universal jurisdiction" principle creates the necessary means for
ensuring prosecution of those charged with crimes when usual jurisdic-
tion requirements are insufficient.
Alternatively, with the political crime exception, the law has been
used to limit the means for prosecution of those charged with certain
crimes. However, as these crimes move from the political arena to more
closely resemble irrational acts of terrorism, society has chosen to act
to prevent protection of those charged with these crimes. As extradition
treaties are being modified to exclude such acts as murder and kidnap-
ping from the protection of the political crime exception, international
law is once again being used to ensure that justice prevails and prose-
cution can proceed.
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